Eleven minutes into Belgium’s match against Italy, Francesco Pio Esposito had given the visitors exactly the start they wanted.
Michael Kayode delivered the ball into the penalty area, and Pio got ahead of Nathan Ngoy to score. Italy were leading 1–0 in Brussels. Having arrived knowing that a draw would be enough to reach the Nations League quarter-finals, they were suddenly in an even stronger position.
It lasted four minutes.
Maxim De Cuyper equalised for Belgium in the 15th minute, following up after Charles De Ketelaere failed to connect cleanly with an attempt inside the box. Seven minutes later, Ngoy scored from close range after a corner.
Then Jérémy Doku took over.
In the 26th minute, the winger carried the ball through several Italian defenders before finishing to put Belgium 3–1 ahead.
Italy had gone from leading to trailing by two goals in just fifteen minutes.
Belgium eventually won 4–1 and secured their place in the quarter-finals. Three days earlier, they had also come from behind to beat Türkiye 2–1.
For Mark van Bommel, those two results offered evidence of something valuable. Belgium could fall behind, respond quickly and turn a difficult match in their favour.
But the victories also brought back an uncomfortable memory.
In October, Belgium had led France until the 77th minute before conceding four goals and losing 4–1.
That match raised questions about their ability to control a game when the opposition suddenly increased the pressure.
November showed Belgium knew how to recover a scoreline. What happened after they took the lead was just as important.
Türkiye had already shown both sides of Belgium
The first comeback came in Izmir on 12 November.
Arda Güler put Türkiye ahead with a free-kick in the 20th minute. Belgium’s response was almost immediate.
Doku helped create the opening for Kevin De Bruyne to equalise in the 27th minute. Around the half-hour mark, De Cuyper was involved again, and De Ketelaere finished from close range to make it 2–1.
Belgium had needed roughly ten minutes to turn the match around.
Neither goal came after a substitution. Van Bommel would not make his first changes until the 69th minute.
That distinction matters because the comeback was not evidence of a coach rescuing the game by bringing on different players.
The response came from the starting team.
Doku created danger, De Bruyne finished an opportunity, and De Ketelaere was in position to take advantage of another attack.
The players already on the pitch had enough attacking quality to solve the immediate problem.
Yet solving the scoreline did not mean Türkiye had stopped threatening.
After half-time, the home side continued to find shooting opportunities. Güler, Barış Alper Yılmaz, Deniz Gül, Yunus Akgün and Hakan Çalhanoğlu all forced goalkeeper Senne Lammens into action.
Türkiye finished with seven shots on target. Lammens made six saves.
Belgium held on to win 2–1, and there is real value in that result. They protected a narrow advantage away from home despite sustained pressure.
But Lammens was a significant reason the lead survived.
The team had succeeded in defending its result. It had not made the second half comfortable.
Three days later, Italy provided another version of the same challenge.
Italy could not handle the speed of Belgium’s response
Belgium’s three early goals against Italy came from different situations.
De Cuyper reacted to a loose ball in the penalty area. Ngoy took advantage of a second action after a corner. Doku beat defenders on the dribble and created the space to finish himself.
There was no single attacking move that Italy repeatedly failed to stop.
Instead, Belgium had several ways of causing damage.
De Bruyne helped connect attacks, De Ketelaere contributed around the penalty area, and Doku’s running repeatedly forced Italian defenders into difficult positions.
When Italy fell behind, they had to take more risks.
After half-time, Roberto Mancini made changes and his side pushed forward, leaving more space for Belgium to exploit.
In the 80th minute, De Bruyne and Doku combined during a counterattack before Diego Moreira finished to make it 4–1.
It was an excellent example of Belgium punishing a team that had committed players forward.
But there was one final moment that mattered to the wider assessment.
Late in the match, Nicolas Raskin handled a shot. After a VAR review, Italy received a penalty.
Pio Esposito stepped up.
Lammens saved it.
The result remained 4–1, a convincing Belgian victory and a deserved place in the quarter-finals.
Still, the penalty was a reminder that Italy had not been shut out of the match simply because Belgium were three goals ahead.
The score reflected Belgium’s attacking superiority. It did not mean every defensive concern had disappeared.
France had exposed a different weakness
To understand what November changed, it helps to return to the match that started the debate.
On 5 October, Belgium travelled to France without De Bruyne and captain Youri Tielemans. Both were suspended.
Dodi Lukébakio scored in the 35th minute and Belgium held their lead deep into the second half.
For much of the evening, they looked capable of competing with France despite losing two experienced midfield organisers.
Then France changed the match.
Désiré Doué equalised in the 77th minute. Rayan Cherki scored four minutes later. Michael Olise added two more goals.
Belgium went from leading 1–0 to losing 4–1.
The concern was not simply that they had conceded four times. It was how little control they seemed able to recover once France’s attacking substitutions increased the speed of the game.
Belgium needed a way to keep the ball for a spell, reconnect their midfield and interrupt France’s momentum.
They could not find one.
That was the conclusion of MATCHIQ’s October analysis: Belgium had shown they could compete without their senior midfielders, but had not demonstrated a reliable way of regaining control once a strong opponent changed the match.
The two November victories were therefore important.
They just did not recreate the same conditions.
This time, De Bruyne and Tielemans were there
Both players started against Türkiye and Italy.
Against Türkiye, Nicolas Raskin joined them in midfield. Against Italy, Roméo Lavia started alongside the two senior players.
Belgium were no longer facing the challenge of playing without both of their established midfield references.
That changes how the comebacks should be interpreted.
De Bruyne was directly involved in the attacking response. Tielemans was available to provide another experienced option in midfield.
The supporting cast changed, but Belgium did not have to discover whether those responsibilities could be carried without either man.
There is also a reason to be careful when crediting Van Bommel’s interventions.
Against Türkiye, Belgium had already taken the lead around the 30th minute. His first substitutions arrived in the 69th.
Against Italy, Belgium were 3–1 ahead by the 26th minute. Their first substitution came in the 75th.
Van Bommel deserves credit for preparing and selecting teams capable of responding so effectively.
But neither comeback was created by a substitution that had already happened.
The clearest evidence belongs to the attacking players who began the matches.
What Belgium have earned the right to claim
There is a strong argument in Belgium’s favour.
They faced difficult moments in both matches and did not fall apart.
Against Türkiye, they protected a one-goal lead. Against Italy, they maintained their advantage and eventually extended it.
That should weaken any sweeping claim that Belgium cannot defend a winning position.
The November results are evidence against such a broad conclusion.
There is an equally strong alternative explanation for the victories, however.
Belgium possess enough individual quality to change a match quickly. Doku can beat several defenders in one run. De Bruyne can produce an important final action. De Ketelaere and others are alert when chances appear in crowded areas.
And when opponents reached dangerous positions, Lammens delivered.
Those qualities can win important matches even when a team has not completely solved its underlying control problem.
The remaining question is therefore more specific than whether Belgium can hold a lead.
It is whether they can deliberately slow a match when a strong opponent starts to dictate the tempo, especially without De Bruyne and Tielemans.
That requires a different kind of evidence.
When Belgium lose possession several times in succession, who offers the next secure passing option? Who takes responsibility for moving the ball out of pressure? Can the team resist forcing another quick attack and instead keep possession long enough to recover its shape?
One possible adjustment would be to bring a midfielder such as Tielemans closer to Lavia or Raskin during difficult phases, creating safer passing options while De Bruyne remains farther forward.
The trade-off would be fewer immediate counterattacking opportunities. A strong opponent could also press those short passes and push Belgium backwards.
It is a possible response to examine, not a claim that Van Bommel used it or that it would certainly have prevented France’s goals.
To establish genuine improvement, those behaviours must appear repeatedly in demanding matches.
The next win may tell us less than the next difficult ten minutes
Belgium finished second in their Nations League group and qualified for the quarter-finals.
They earned that place with two impressive comebacks in November.
The new evidence deserves a change in judgment: Belgium have shown they can respond rapidly to an early setback, and they are capable of protecting an advantage through difficult periods.
The October concern also needs to remain properly defined.
France tested Belgium against elite late pressure while De Bruyne and Tielemans were missing. Türkiye and Italy tested their ability to respond to early deficits with both midfielders available.
Those are different demands.
The next useful test will not necessarily be another match in which Belgium fall behind and score three goals.
It will be a passage of play when they are already leading, the opponent is pressing harder and the usual midfield organisers are unavailable or being denied the ball.
If Belgium can hold possession, reconnect their players and decide when to accelerate again, their recent results will begin to tell a bigger story.
For now, November has answered one part of the question.
Belgium can fight their way back.
What remains to be established is whether they can take control of a match that is trying to get away from them.
Sources and further reading
- Royal Belgian FA — Türkiye 1–2 Belgium, 12 November 2026
- UEFA — Türkiye vs Belgium: official match statistics
- FIGC — Belgium 4–1 Italy, 15 November 2026
- UEFA — Nations League final matchday report
- MATCHIQ — Belgium Led France Until the 77th Minute
- MATCHIQ — Belgium’s Earlier Control Problem Against Türkiye
