Diogo Dalot had an early chance to put Manchester United ahead against Como.
Matheus Cunha found him inside the penalty area, and Dalot managed to get a shot away. It went wide.
Soon afterwards, Nico Paz showed United what they had missed. The Como midfielder curled the ball past Senne Lammens, giving the home side the lead.
United had reached a dangerous position without scoring. Como had made their opportunity count.
By the end of the night, that difference had become painfully familiar.
Michael Carrick’s side lost 4–1, despite attempting 13 shots to Como’s 11. On paper, United had been getting efforts away. A closer look at where those efforts came from tells a less encouraging story.
Eight of United’s 13 shots were taken from outside the penalty area. Only five came from inside it, and they created just one big chance.
United weren’t short of players willing to shoot. They were struggling to get into positions where a shot had a better chance of becoming a goal.
And that brings us to Bruno Fernandes.
Bruno came looking for the ball. Who was waiting ahead of him?
Carrick went into the game without Benjamin Šeško, limiting his options through the middle.
Bryan Mbeumo was named as the central attacking option, but United’s movement was more fluid than the team sheet suggested. Fernandes also took on duties resembling those of a false nine, moving away from the forward line to become involved in possession.
There was logic behind the idea.
Bruno is one of United’s most inventive passers. He can find space between opponents, receive the ball under pressure and spot runs that other players might miss.
Move him closer to the front, let him drift towards the ball, and there is a chance he will create openings for teammates.
The difficulty comes after he moves.
Imagine Fernandes dropping towards midfield to receive a pass. If a defender follows him, space may open closer to goal. That is precisely where United need someone else to arrive.
Mbeumo might run beyond the defence. A winger could cut inside. A midfielder could attack the area late.
Without that movement, Bruno can end up receiving the ball with very little happening ahead of him.
United did find their way into the box at times.
Dalot’s early chance was one example. In the 17th minute, Harry Maguire headed wide from Mbeumo’s cross. Later, Fernandes lifted a pass towards Amad inside the area, but the winger couldn’t quite reach it.
Those moments showed United had routes towards goal. They simply didn’t produce enough of them.
With eight attempts coming from distance, their attack repeatedly finished before they had reached the most dangerous shooting areas.
It is tempting to blame that entirely on Fernandes operating as a false nine. The match statistics don’t establish that. To make that claim, we would need to see how often he dropped away, what runs his teammates made and how Como’s defenders responded.
What we can say is that United’s forward movement wasn’t producing enough good shooting opportunities.
And Como deserve considerable credit for that.
Como kept making United work for everything
Cesc Fàbregas’s side were not interested in sitting back and surviving.
They controlled 55% of possession, moved the ball confidently through midfield and repeatedly found ways to involve their attacking players.
Paz was central to the damage.
After opening the scoring, he helped create Como’s second goal for Anastasios Douvikas early in the second half. He then scored again in the 57th minute.
Como were doing several things United wanted to do themselves: bringing players into useful positions, connecting passes and turning those movements into chances.
That made life harder for Carrick’s attackers.
When United recovered possession, they weren’t always building from comfortable positions. Como could close the passing routes towards goal, leaving United to recycle the ball or try their luck from farther out.
Some of those long-range attempts may have reflected poor attacking choices. Others may have been the best shots Como’s defending allowed.
Either way, the difference between the two attacks was clear enough. Como were getting players into areas where they could hurt United. Carrick’s team spent too much of the evening looking for a way through.
Carrick changed the attack, but Como were already taking control
At half-time, United were only one goal behind.
Carrick still had a chance to change the direction of the match.
He replaced Cunha and Andrey Santos with Amad and Carlos Baleba, moving Fernandes towards his more familiar No.10 position and allowing Mbeumo to lead the line.
The adjustment gave United a clearer division of attacking responsibilities. Fernandes could concentrate on finding passes from behind the forwards, while Amad offered another route into the penalty area.
Before United could turn that change into sustained pressure, Como scored again.
Douvikas made it 2–0 in the 49th minute. Paz added another eight minutes later.
Now United weren’t simply trying to improve their attack. They were chasing a match that had moved further out of reach.
Amad later produced a powerful shot from outside the area, forcing goalkeeper Jean Butez into a save. It was a dangerous effort, but it also reflected the problem United had been experiencing throughout the evening: much of their threat was still coming from distance.
In the 67th minute, Carrick replaced Fernandes with Joshua Zirkzee.
Zirkzee eventually scored in stoppage time, taking Amad’s delivery inside the area and finishing past Butez.
For once, United had a player receiving the ball in a dangerous central position, with the final pass reaching him at the right moment.
It was exactly the sort of connection they had been missing.
But the goal arrived when Como were already four goals ahead. One successful late move could not tell Carrick whether Zirkzee would have provided the same answer from the start.
Could United have used Bruno differently?
Carrick had another possible route available at half-time.
With United trailing 1–0, he could have considered bringing Zirkzee on earlier, keeping a more recognisable centre-forward ahead of Fernandes and moving Mbeumo towards the flank.
That might have given United a clearer target for crosses and passes into the box.
It would also have changed how they pressed Como.
A central forward occupying the defenders may help create passing targets, but that does not automatically make him the best player to lead every defensive action. Como might have responded by crowding the central space and forcing United wide again.
There was also a less disruptive possibility.
If Carrick wanted Fernandes to keep dropping towards the ball, he could have made sure one of the wide attackers attacked the space behind him as soon as he moved.
That would let Bruno do what he does well without leaving the forward line short of runners.
The risk is that committing another player forward leaves less protection when possession changes hands. Against a Como side already capable of playing quickly through midfield, that trade-off could have been costly.
Neither option comes with a guarantee. Both depend on the players available and the spaces Como were actually leaving.
But they identify the decision United needed to make: if Fernandes moves away from goal to create, who takes responsibility for arriving near it?
The next test is about movement, not formations
Earlier this season, MATCHIQ examined United’s dependence on Fernandes after his hat-trick against Ipswich.
That performance showed what his quality could deliver when he was involved in the right attacking situations.
Como presented a different challenge. Carrick tried to make use of Bruno’s movement and creativity across the forward line, yet United struggled to build enough attacks that ended inside the penalty area.
The next time Fernandes drops towards midfield, watch what happens ahead of him.
Does Mbeumo attack the space? Does a winger move inside? Can United find that runner before the defence recovers?
Those details will say far more about the success of Carrick’s approach than the position assigned to Bruno on a team sheet.
United don’t need their captain to invent every attacking move on his own.
They need someone to be there when he creates the opening.
Sources and related reading