Sixteen minutes into Manchester City’s match against Fulham, Rodrigo Muniz was already celebrating.
The move had begun deep inside Fulham’s own half. A throw-in, an aerial challenge, and suddenly Oscar Bobb was carrying the ball forward down the right. Muniz, who had helped Fulham retain possession moments earlier, continued his run, received the return pass and curled his finish beyond Gianluigi Donnarumma.
City were 1–0 down.
For Enzo Maresca, it was an increasingly familiar sight. His team had now conceded first in four consecutive Premier League matches. Whatever the manager had planned before kick-off, his players were once again facing the task of recovering from an early setback.
This time, Maresca had tried something different.
Elliot Anderson, usually given responsibilities deeper in midfield, was playing in a more advanced attacking role for the first time this season. Rather than spending much of his time helping City build attacks from further back, he had been asked to operate closer to Fulham’s penalty area.
And in the 57th minute, that decision became part of City’s comeback.
Fulham cleared a corner, but the ball only travelled as far as Anderson outside the box. He met it with a first-time volley, sending a powerful shot beyond Bernd Leno.
City were level.
Anderson had given Maresca exactly the kind of attacking contribution he wanted from his new position. Yet when the final whistle arrived, the score remained 1–1.
City had stopped their three-match Premier League losing streak, but they had not won. They had also gone another match without keeping a clean sheet.
Maresca had found something useful in attack. What he had not found was a way to stop his team from needing another rescue.
Why Maresca wanted Anderson closer to goal
Moving Anderson forward was not quite the gamble it might have appeared.
Before the season began, Maresca had spoken about the midfielder’s versatility. Anderson could operate deeper, play as a No.8 and make runs into the penalty area.
Those qualities gave his manager options.
A player capable of winning possession and helping move the ball through midfield can also become a threat when he arrives closer to goal. Anderson offered that possibility, and against Fulham, Maresca decided to explore it more directly.
After the match, the City manager confirmed that Anderson had played as an attacking midfielder for the first time this season. He also explained that the responsibilities of Anderson and Ayyoub Bouaddi had changed, allowing Anderson to operate further forward.
The effect was not limited to the equaliser.
Later in the match, Erling Haaland created another opportunity for Anderson inside the penalty area. This time the midfielder sent his effort narrowly wide.
Maresca also pointed to other dangerous moments Anderson had produced around Fulham’s goal.
There was enough in those contributions to justify another look at the arrangement.
Still, the nature of Anderson’s goal matters.
It came from the second ball after a corner, not from a passing move in which his advanced position pulled Fulham’s midfield apart. His finish was excellent, but the goal alone does not explain whether City’s attacking structure had improved.
The more convincing argument comes from the broader picture: Anderson was involved in dangerous areas more often, and he gave City another player capable of finishing an attack.
That was a positive outcome for Maresca.
But while Anderson was showing what he could offer further forward, Fulham’s opening goal had already exposed another concern.
The move that put City behind
Fulham did not need a long spell of possession around City’s penalty area to score.
Their goal developed from a throw-in in their own half.
As the move unfolded, Marc Guéhi had stepped forward to contest possession. Bouaddi then lost an aerial challenge against Muniz, allowing Fulham to keep the attack alive.
Bobb drove forward on the right. Muniz kept running, arrived in position to receive the pass and finished the move.
It was a fine piece of attacking play, and Fulham deserved credit for how quickly they advanced.
For City, the worrying part was what happened after the initial contest was lost.
Guéhi had moved away from his defensive position. Fulham were then able to progress the ball, while Muniz covered enough ground to become both an early contributor and the eventual goalscorer.
That sequence raises questions about City’s defensive support and recovery.
Who was protecting the space behind Guéhi? Could someone in midfield have slowed Bobb’s advance? How did Muniz remain available to finish after playing a part in the original aerial challenge?
These questions are more useful than simply blaming the nearest defender.
They also matter when assessing Anderson’s new position.
Moving a midfielder closer to goal can change the number of players available behind the ball. But there is not yet enough positional evidence from this sequence to establish that Anderson’s advanced role caused Fulham’s breakthrough.
The immediate failure involved City’s unsuccessful challenge and their inability to stop the attack that followed.
And unfortunately for Maresca, this was not the first time an opponent had found a way to punish his side.
Different mistakes, the same uncomfortable scoreline
By the end of the Fulham match, Manchester City had gone nine consecutive games across all competitions without a clean sheet.
They had conceded 18 goals during that run.
Those figures tell Maresca how serious the problem has become. They do not tell him precisely how to fix it.
Earlier in November, MATCHIQ examined City’s defeats to Aston Villa, Brighton and Nottingham Forest.
All three opponents had scored inside the opening 11 minutes. But the goals told different stories.
Against Villa, Guéhi miscontrolled a pass when he was not under direct pressure. John McGinn reacted, and Nicolas Jackson finished the opportunity.
Brighton’s goal began with a quickly taken free-kick. Diego Gómez delivered the ball into the penalty area, Matheus Nunes failed to clear, and Yasin Ayari eventually scored.
Forest attacked the problem differently. Jair Cunha stepped forward to challenge Joško Gvardiol, won possession and scored himself.
Later in that match, Forest repeatedly threatened City by winning important contests and attacking before the midfield and defence could recover.
Fulham’s opener adds another example.
There is a connection with some of Forest’s attacking moves: City lost a challenge and struggled to stop the opponent’s progress afterwards.
But that does not turn every goal conceded against Villa, Brighton, Forest and Fulham into evidence of one identical tactical weakness.
Maresca is dealing with several problems that keep producing a familiar consequence.
His team falls behind, the opposition has a lead to protect, and City’s attacking players must spend the rest of the match trying to repair the damage.
That is a difficult way to keep winning football matches.
It also helps explain why Anderson’s equaliser, impressive as it was, could only rescue a point.
City had chances to win
There is another side to the Fulham result that deserves attention.
Manchester City did not spend the entire match struggling to create opportunities.
They attempted 15 shots compared with Fulham’s five. According to Sky Sports, City’s expected goals total was 1.87, while Fulham’s was 0.74.
City generated chances that could have produced a winner.
Haaland had a first-half effort ruled out after the officials judged that Leno already controlled the ball. Anderson later went close again after receiving a pass from Haaland.
But City’s finishing let them down.
Only three of their 15 attempts were on target. Fulham, despite shooting just five times, managed four efforts on target.
Fulham’s defenders also played their part, with David Affengruber among those helping to block dangerous attempts.
So it would be misleading to argue that Maresca’s attacking changes had achieved nothing.
Anderson gave City another threat near goal, and the hosts created enough opportunities to expect more than a single goal.
They simply did not turn enough of those opportunities into finishes that troubled Leno.
That is an attacking problem Maresca can work on.
Preventing opponents from taking the lead so regularly requires a different kind of improvement.
The choice Maresca now faces
After watching Anderson against Fulham, Maresca has a good reason to consider keeping him in an advanced role.
The midfielder scored, threatened the box again and showed he could contribute further forward.
Removing him from that position simply because City conceded would be a rushed conclusion.
The more demanding decision concerns what happens behind Anderson.
If Guéhi steps out to challenge for possession, someone must be ready to protect the space he leaves. When City lose an aerial duel, the midfield needs to respond before the opponent can accelerate into dangerous territory.
One possible adjustment would be to give the deeper midfielder, potentially Bouaddi, a clearer responsibility to protect central space during those moments.
That could allow Anderson to remain closer to goal without leaving City as exposed when possession is lost.
But it would come with a cost.
Keeping an extra midfielder in a protective position may reduce the numbers available to press immediately. Opponents could gain more time to control the ball and choose their next pass.
Maresca therefore has to decide where City need their players most, and at which moments.
The answer cannot come from Anderson’s goal alone. Nor can it be found simply by counting the number of games without a clean sheet.
City need to establish whether their difficulties come from poor positioning, unsuccessful individual challenges or players failing to recover together quickly enough.
Each problem demands a different response.
A new option, with an old problem still waiting
The Fulham draw left Maresca with an encouraging discovery and an uncomfortable reminder.
Anderson had shown he could offer more in attack. His first start in a more advanced role this season produced the goal City needed to avoid another defeat.
But Muniz had already made that goal necessary.
City’s next matches against Napoli on 24 November and Arsenal on 29 November offer opportunities to test whether Anderson can keep influencing attacks while the team provides better protection behind him.
The crucial evidence will come from how City react when possession is lost, how their midfield covers advancing defenders and whether their opponents continue finding openings before the match has settled.
Anderson has given Maresca another way to fight back.
Now City need to find a way to stop falling behind.
