Carlos Forbs had already helped Club Brugge score three times when Inter Milan finally reduced the deficit to 3–2.
Lautaro Martínez had just grabbed his second goal of the evening. There were nine minutes of normal time remaining at San Siro, and Inter were still creating chances.
The equaliser looked possible.
Then, in the 87th minute, Forbs found another opening.
He released Romeo Vermant with a forward pass. Vermant, who had only recently come off the bench, got through on goal and finished past Josep Martínez.
Inter were 4–2 down.
Ange-Yoan Bonny scored in stoppage time, but the final whistle confirmed a 4–3 Champions League defeat for Cristian Chivu’s team.
Seven goals, thirty Inter shots and a hat-trick for Brugge striker Nicolò Tresoldi.
There was plenty to talk about.
Yet one question stands out when the goals are examined together.
Inter knew Club Brugge had pace out wide. They had identified it in their own pre-match scouting. Forbs was specifically named as one of the players who could beat defenders and create danger.
So how did he remain such an important part of Brugge’s attack throughout the night?
The answer is not simply that Inter’s defenders were too slow. The goals came from different situations, including a penalty, a goalkeeper error, a rebound and a late counterattack.
But those different situations also exposed how many times Brugge could turn Forbs’ involvement into an opportunity.
Inter had been warned about Brugge’s wide players
Two days before the match, Inter published an opposition analysis of Ivan Leko’s side.
The scouting report described Brugge as a young, ambitious team willing to play attacking football. It highlighted the wingers’ ability to take on defenders, exploit the flanks and create openings for central runners.
Forbs was among the players identified.
That was important information.
Brugge had already demonstrated the danger in their opening Champions League defeat to Aston Villa. Although they lost 3–2, both goals had originated from wide attacking situations.
Inter therefore faced an opponent whose main strengths were not a mystery.
Chivu selected a 3-5-2, with Yann Bisseck, Manuel Akanji and Alessandro Bastoni as the three centre-backs. Andy Diouf and Federico Dimarco provided the wing-back positions, while Nicolò Barella, Hakan Çalhanoğlu and Piotr Zieliński formed the midfield.
Marcus Thuram partnered Lautaro Martínez up front.
On paper, Inter had numbers in central areas and players capable of providing width in attack.
But there is a difficult balance in that formation.
The wing-backs help Inter create chances by moving forward. When they do, the centre-backs and midfielders must be ready to protect the spaces that appear behind them.
If the opponent can move the ball forward before those players recover their positions, even a back three can find itself defending dangerous situations.
That is the risk Inter needed to manage against a side with Forbs’ speed.
It is not enough to identify the threat before kick-off. The team must keep responding to it as the match changes.
Brugge didn’t need to wait for Inter’s pressure to disappear
Inter made an aggressive start and created opportunities.
But Brugge soon showed their own threat.
Tresoldi hit the post after Inter failed to clear a corner properly. It was an early indication that the visitors could create danger without needing to dominate possession.
In the 29th minute, Forbs caused another problem.
He entered the penalty area and was fouled by Çalhanoğlu. The referee awarded a penalty, and Tresoldi converted in the 30th minute.
Brugge led 1–0.
Forbs had not recorded an assist in the usual sense. He had done something equally valuable: his attacking action forced a defender into a challenge that gave Brugge a clear scoring opportunity.
Inter responded.
Their attacking pressure continued, and Lautaro eventually equalised in the 44th minute after a move involving Thuram and Dimarco.
At half-time, it was 1–1.
That first half offered a reasonable argument in Chivu’s favour.
Inter had created chances, fallen behind and recovered. The attacking plan was producing opportunities, and the players had shown they could respond to a setback.
The problem was not that Inter lacked the ability to attack Brugge.
The harder question was whether they could keep that attacking ambition without becoming easier to hurt at the other end.
The second half became too open for Inter
Chivu’s assessment after the match was revealing.
He felt Inter had reacted well to the first goal and had maintained good intensity during the opening half. They also started the second half positively.
But he acknowledged that the team subsequently became too hurried and lost its balance and positional distances when pressing.
That is a much more specific criticism than saying Inter simply didn’t fight hard enough.
A team can press aggressively and still defend badly.
Pressing is not just about the closest player running towards the ball. The teammates behind that player must be close enough to protect the next pass or recover if the opponent escapes.
If one midfielder charges forward while the next remains too far away, an opponent can suddenly find a large space to attack.
Against a player such as Forbs, that is a particularly dangerous situation.
However, the next goal shows why Inter’s problems cannot be attributed to pressing alone.
In the 63rd minute, Josep Martínez came out to deal with a ball outside his goal area. Forbs took advantage of the goalkeeper’s mistake and found Tresoldi, who restored Brugge’s lead.
It was 2–1.
Forbs deserved credit for reacting quickly and using the opportunity. The goalkeeper’s decision and execution also mattered.
It would be inaccurate to claim that a midfielder being too far forward directly caused that goal without establishing the full sequence.
Chivu’s comments support concerns about collective spacing. The 63rd-minute incident also demands separate scrutiny of the goalkeeper’s positioning and decision-making.
Both can be problems in the same match without being the same problem.
Forbs kept turning small openings into real chances
Inter were now chasing the game again.
Chivu introduced Petar Sučić and Francesco Pio Esposito in the 67th minute, replacing Çalhanoğlu and Thuram.
That was an understandable response to falling behind. Inter needed fresh ways to move the ball forward and find Lautaro.
But Brugge continued creating danger.
In the 74th minute, Forbs took another shot. Josep Martínez saved it, but Tresoldi reacted to the loose ball and finished the rebound.
Hat-trick.
Inter trailed 3–1.
Once again, the attacking contribution had two separate parts.
Forbs produced the attempt that forced the goalkeeper into action. Tresoldi recognised where the rebound might fall and completed the finish.
That goal should not be described simply as another clean through-ball assist from Forbs. The shot, save and second ball are essential to understanding how it happened.
It also does not prove that the same player made the same defensive error as in the second goal.
What it does show is that Brugge were repeatedly finding ways to put Inter’s defenders and goalkeeper under pressure.
And Tresoldi was repeatedly arriving where he needed to be.
The German youth international deserves the attention a Champions League hat-trick brings.
His penalty, his response to the goalkeeper mistake and his reaction to the rebound required different types of execution.
Forbs helped create the circumstances. Tresoldi converted them.
Reducing everything to either man’s individual brilliance would miss how effectively those attacking actions worked together.
Lautaro gave Inter a chance. Brugge took it away again.
With the score at 3–1, Inter still refused to disappear.
Chivu made further changes, introducing Bonny and Djed Spence in the 78th minute.
The hosts continued to attack.
In the 81st minute, a shot from Sučić was saved by Yann Sommer, and Lautaro was on hand to finish the resulting opportunity.
3–2.
Inter were one goal away from rescuing the match.
They created further chances to equalise. Sommer, who had previously played for Inter, remained an important obstacle.
Brugge were now under pressure to preserve their narrow lead.
But the Belgian visitors still had an attacking option that could punish Inter when possession changed.
Leko introduced Romeo Vermant in the 83rd minute, replacing Tresoldi.
Four minutes later, Forbs released the substitute into space with a forward pass.
Vermant finished.
4–2.
That sequence deserves attention because it came after Inter had pulled a goal back.
At 3–2, Inter needed to keep attacking. Brugge needed to defend their advantage while remaining ready to exploit the space that might appear.
Forbs provided the forward pass. Vermant delivered the finish.
This wasn’t merely Inter making another mistake. Brugge’s substitutions, passing and finishing were meaningful contributions.
Bonny’s stoppage-time goal brought Inter back to 4–3, but there was no equaliser.
Chivu had watched his team score three times and lose.
Thirty shots weren’t enough to hide the defensive problem
The final statistics make the result look unusual.
According to FotMob, Inter attempted 30 shots and Brugge took 18.
Inter’s expected goals were 3.93, while Brugge recorded 4.26.
Inter also had 53% possession.
Those figures are not evidence that Inter’s attack was useless.
A team creating thirty attempts and almost four expected goals has generated substantial attacking danger. Lautaro’s two goals and Bonny’s late finish were real contributions.
But the numbers also make it difficult to describe Brugge as a team that stole the match through a few hopeless shots.
Although they attempted fewer shots, their estimated chance quality was slightly higher according to the same provider.
There are important qualifications.
Brugge’s total includes a penalty. The second goal involved a goalkeeper error, while the third followed a save and rebound. These situations do not all tell us the same thing about Inter’s open-play defensive organisation.
Expected goals also describe the entire match, not exclusively the period before or after Chivu changed his midfield.
The useful conclusion is more precise.
Inter created enough opportunities to win, but they also allowed Brugge to produce dangerous situations through several routes.
Their greater attacking volume did not compensate for the chances conceded.
And that brings the discussion back to Chivu’s comments about the distances between his players.
Chivu doesn’t need to abandon the attack to protect it
The most useful tactical question begins with the score at 1–1, early in the second half.
Inter were at home. They wanted to win, and their attacking approach had already created chances.
Simply retreating to protect a draw would not necessarily have served that objective.
But continuing to commit players forward without protecting the space behind the first press was another risk.
One possible adjustment would have been to make the responsibilities on the ball side more selective.
If Forbs threatened down Brugge’s right, Inter’s left-side players needed to decide who would challenge him and who would remain behind the challenge.
Dimarco could help limit the space available to the winger when positioned to do so. Bastoni, as the left-sided centre-back, would need to protect the route towards the goal rather than following every movement into the channel.
The nearest central midfielder would then have to be aware of the passing lane behind the first challenge.
Those are proposed responsibilities based on the players’ nominal positions, not a claim that the match footage proves they failed at each moment.
The key is avoiding a situation where several Inter players move towards the ball while the next receiver is left unprotected.
There is a cost.
Holding an additional midfielder deeper means Inter may have fewer bodies around Lautaro when possession moves into the attacking third. Keeping Dimarco more cautious can also reduce one of the team’s most productive crossing options.
Brugge could respond by switching their attack to Virgili on the opposite side or using Vanaken between the lines.
So this would not be a guaranteed defensive solution.
It would be a choice to reduce the danger of a direct escape while preserving enough attacking players to pursue the win.
After the 63rd-minute goal, another correction becomes relevant.
Inter’s goalkeeper and defenders need clear decisions about when Martínez should advance to intercept a pass and when the defenders should deal with the runner themselves.
If the goalkeeper commits and loses the ball, the original defensive structure may no longer be in a position to protect the goal.
That part of the match cannot be fixed simply by telling a midfielder to stay deeper.
The full goal sequences are needed to establish which specific decisions should have been different.
What is already clear is that Inter had several distinct problems to solve, not one magical formation change waiting to be discovered.
Brugge were dangerous before Inter knew the result
There is one detail that makes this defeat particularly uncomfortable for Inter.
Their own pre-match report had identified Brugge’s wide players as a major threat. It described Forbs’ pace, his ability to take on opponents and the attacking value of the team’s runners.
That analysis was not wrong.
The problem was that Inter still could not prevent those strengths from influencing the match.
Forbs won the penalty, exploited the goalkeeper error, forced the shot that produced the third goal and set up Vermant for the fourth.
Not every action arose from the same weakness. Yet Brugge repeatedly found productive ways to involve him.
That is a stronger explanation of the defeat than simply saying a famous club underestimated a smaller opponent.
Ivan Leko’s team played with pace, quality and conviction. They didn’t win merely because Inter made mistakes; they were good enough to turn those mistakes and openings into goals.
For Inter, the next step is not to stop creating chances.
It is to make their pressing and defensive cover work together, especially when the match becomes more open and the opponent has the pace to attack the space behind them.
The next fixtures against Bologna and Shakhtar Donetsk will offer opportunities to examine whether those responsibilities have improved.
The result alone will not answer that question.
The better signs will be whether Inter can press without leaving the next pass uncovered, whether opponents can still run directly at their back three, and whether the team can maintain those distances while chasing a goal.
Inter’s thirty shots showed that the attacking ability is there.
Forbs’ involvement in four Club Brugge goals showed just how costly it can be when the opponent keeps finding a way through.
Sources and previous MATCHIQ research
Inter — Chivu’s Post-Match Assessment
Inter — Official Starting Lineups
Inter — Club Brugge Opposition Analysis
Inter — Match Highlights and Scoring Summary
FotMob — Inter vs Club Brugge Match Statistics
The Guardian — Champions League Matchday Report
Post-match analysis dated 14 October 2026. The goal sequence, official lineups, Chivu’s comments and full-match statistics have been checked against published sources. Specific pressing positions, individual marking duties and the complete attacking phases leading to the goals require further video review.